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Abstract
We introduce and analyze greedy equilibria (GE) for the well-known model of selfish net-
work creation by Fabrikant et al. [PODC’03]. GE are interesting for two reasons: (1) they
model outcomes found by agents which prefer smooth adaptations over radical strategy-
changes, (2) GE are outcomes found by agents which do not have enough computational
resources to play optimally. In the model of Fabrikant et al. agents correspond to Inter-
net Service Providers which buy network links to improve their quality of network usage.
It is known that computing a best response in this model is NP-hard. Hence, poly-time
agents are likely not to play optimally. But how good are networks created by such
agents? We answer this question for very simple agents. Quite surprisingly, naive greedy
play suffices to create remarkably stable networks. Specifically, we show that in the Sum
version, where agents attempt to minimize their average distance to all other agents, GE
capture Nash equilibria (NE) on trees and that any GE is in 3-approximate NE on general
networks. For the latter we also provide a lower bound of 32 on the approximation ratio.
For the Max version, where agents attempt to minimize their maximum distance, we
show that any GE-star is in 2-approximate NE and any GE-tree having larger diameter
is in 65 -approximate NE. Both bounds are tight. We contrast these positive results by
providing a linear lower bound on the approximation ratio for the Max version on general
networks in GE. This result implies a locality gap of Ω(n) for the metric min-max facility
location problem, where n is the number of clients.
1 Introduction
The area of Network Design is one of the classical and still very active fields in the realm
of Theoretical Computer Science and Operations Research. But there is this curious fact:
One of the most important networks which is increasingly shaping our everyday life – the
Internet – cannot be fully explained by classical Network Design theory. Unlike centrally
designed and optimized networks, the Internet was and still is created by a multitude of selfish
agents (Internet Service Providers (ISPs)), who control and modify varying sized portions
of the network structure (“autonomous systems”). This decentralized nature is an obstacle
to approaching the design and analysis of the Internet as a classical optimization problem.
Interestingly, each agent does face classical Network Design problems, i.e. minimizing the
∗See [14] for the original publication.
†Department of Computer Science, Humboldt-Universita¨t zu Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin,
Germany. Email: lenzner@informatik.hu-berlin.de
1
ar
X
iv
:1
21
0.
79
70
v1
  [
cs
.G
T]
  3
0 O
ct 
20
12
cost of connecting the own network to the rest of the Internet while ensuring a high quality
of service. The Internet is the result of the interplay of such local strategies and can be
considered as an equilibrium state of a game played by selfish agents.
The classical and most popular solution concept of such games is the (pure) Nash equi-
librium [17], which is a stable state, where no agent unilaterally wants to change her current
(pure) strategy. However, Nash equilibria (NE) have their difficulties. Besides their purely
descriptive, non-algorithmic nature, there are two problems: (1) With NE as solution concept
agents only care if there is a better strategy and would perform radical strategy-changes even
if they only yield a tiny improvement. (2) In some games it is computationally hard to even
tell if a stable state is reached because computing the best possible strategy of an agent is
hard. Thus, for such games NE only predict stable states found by supernatural agents.
But what solutions are actually found by more realistic players, i.e. by agents who prefer
smooth strategy-changes and who can only perform polynomial-time computations? And
what impact on the stability has this transition from supernatural to realistic players?
In this paper, we take the first steps towards answering these questions for one of the
most popular models of selfish network creation. This model, called the Network Cre-
ation Game (NCG), was introduced a decade ago by Fabrikant et al. [9]. In NCGs agents
correspond to ISPs who create links towards other ISPs while minimizing cost and maximiz-
ing their quality of network usage. It seems reasonable that ISPs prefer greedy refinements
of their current strategy (network architecture) over a strategy-change which involves a rad-
ical re-design of their infrastructure. Furthermore, computing the best strategy in NCGs is
NP-hard. Hence, it seems realistic to assume that agents perform smooth strategy-changes
and that they do not play optimally. We take this idea to the extreme by considering very
simple agents and by introducing and analyzing a natural solution concept, called greedy
equilibrium, for which agents can easily compute whether a stable state is reached and which
models an ISP’s preference for smooth strategy-changes.
1.1 Model and Definitions
In NCGs [9] there is a set of n agents V and each agent v ∈ V can buy an edge {v, u} to any
agent u ∈ V for the price of α > 0. Here α is a fixed parameter of the game which specifies
the cost of creating any link. The strategy Sv of an agent v is the set of vertices towards
which v buys an edge. Let G = (V,E) be the induced network, where an edge {x, y} ∈ E
is present if x ∈ Sy or y ∈ Sx. The network G will depend heavily on the parameter α. To
state this explicitly, we let (G,α) denote the network induced by the strategies of all agents
V . In a NCG agents selfishly choose strategies to minimize their cost. There are basically
two versions of NCGs, depending on the definition of an agent’s cost-function. In the Sum
version [9], agents try to minimize the sum of their shortest path lengths to all other nodes
in the network, while in the Max version [7], agents try to minimize their maximum shortest
path distance to any other network node. The precise definitions are as follows: Let Sv
denote agent v’s strategy in (G,α), then we have for the Sum version that the cost of agent
v is cv(G,α) = α|Sv| +
∑
w∈V (G) dG(v, w), if G is connected and cv(G,α) = ∞, otherwise.
For the Max version we define agent v’s cost as c′v(G,α) = α|Sv|+ maxw∈V (G) dG(v, w), if G
is connected and c′v(G,α) = ∞, otherwise. In both cases dG(·, ·) denotes the shortest path
distance in the graph G. Note that both cost functions nicely incorporate two conflicting
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objectives: Agents want to pay as little as possible for being connected to the network while
at the same time they want to have good connection quality. For NCGs we are naturally
interested in networks where no agent unilaterally wants to change her strategy. Clearly,
such outcomes are pure NE and we let Sum-NE denote the set of all pure NE of NCGs for
the Sum version and Max-NE denotes the corresponding set for the Max version.
Another important notion is the concept of approximate Nash equilibria. Let (G,α) be
any network in a NCG. For all u ∈ V (G) let c(u) and c∗(u) denote agent u’s cost induced
by her current pure strategy in (G,α) and by her best possible pure strategy, respectively.
We say that (G,α) is a β-approximate Nash equilibrium if for all agents u ∈ V (G) we have
c(u) ≤ βc∗(u), for some β ≥ 1.
1.2 Related Work
The work of Fabrikant et al. [9] did not only introduce the very elegant model described
above. Among other results, the authors showed that computing a best possible strategy of
an agent is NP-hard.
To remove the quite intricate dependence on the parameter α, Alon et al. [3] recently
introduced the Basic Network Creation Game (BNCG), in which a network G is given
and agents can only “swap” incident edges to decrease their cost. Here, a swap is the exchange
of an incident edge with a non-existing incident edge. The cost of an agent is defined like in
NCGs but without the edge-cost term. The authors of [3] proposed the swap equilibrium (SE)
as solution concept for BNCGs. A network is in SE, if no agent unilaterally wants to swap an
edge to decrease her cost. This solution concept has the nice property that agents can check in
polynomial time if they can perform an improving strategy-change. The greedy equilibrium,
which we analyze later, can be understood as an extension of the swap equilibrium which
has similar properties but provides agents more freedom to act. Note, that in BNCGs an
agent can swap any incident edge, whereas in NCGs only edges which are bought by agent
v can be modified by agent v. This problem, first observed by Mihala´k and Schlegel [15],
can easily be circumvented, as recently proposed by the same authors in [16]: BNCGs are
modified such that every edge is owned by exactly one agent and agents can only swap own
edges. The corresponding stable networks of this modified version are called asymmetric
swap equilibrium (ASE). However, independent of the ownership, edges are still two-way.
These simplified versions of NCGs are an interesting object of study since (asymmetric) swap
equilibria model the local weighing of decisions of agents and despite their innocent statement
they tend to be quite complicated structures. In [13] it was shown that greedy dynamics in a
BNCG converge very quickly to a stable state if played on a tree. The authors of [5] analyzed
BNCGs on trees with agents having communication interests. However, simplifying the model
as in [3] is not without its problems. Allowing only edge-swaps implies that the number of
edges remains constant. Hence, this model seems too limited to explain the creation of rapidly
growing networks.
A part of our work focuses on tree networks. Such topologies are common outcomes of
NCGs if edges are expensive, which led the authors of [9] to conjecture that all (non-transient)
stable networks of NCGs are trees if α is greater than some constant. The conjecture was later
disproved by Albers et al. [1] but it was shown to be true for high edge-cost. In particular,
the authors of [15] proved that all stable networks are trees if α > 273n in the Sum version
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or if α > 129 in the Max version. Experimental evidence suggests that this transition to tree
networks already happens at much lower edge-cost and it is an interesting open problem to
improve on these bounds.
Demaine et al. [6] investigated NCGs, where agents cannot buy every possible edge.
Furthermore, Ehsani et al. [8] recently analyzed a bounded-budget version. Both versions
seem realistic, but in the following we do not restrict the set of edges which can be bought or
the budget of an agent. Clearly, such restrictions reduce the qualitative gap between simple
and arbitrary strategy-changes and would lead to weaker results for our analysis. Note, that
this indicates that outcomes found by simple agents in the edge or budget-restricted version
may be even more stable than we show in the following sections.
To the best of our knowledge, approximate Nash equilibria have not been studied before
in the context of selfish network creation. Closest to our approach here may be the work of
Albers et al. [2], which analyzes for a related game how tolerant the agents have to be in
order to accept a centrally designed solution. We adopt a similar point of view by asking
how tolerant agents have to be to accept a solution found by greedy play.
Guyla´s et al. [10] recently published a paper having a very similar title to ours. They in-
vestigate networks created by agents who use the length of “greedy paths” as communication
cost and show that the resulting equilibria are substantially different to the ones we consider
here. Their term “greedy” refers to the distances whereas our term “greedy” refers to the
behavior of the agents.
1.3 Our Contribution
We introduce and analyze greedy equilibria (GE) as a new solution concept for NCGs. This
solution concept is based on the idea that agents (ISPs) prefer greedy refinements of their cur-
rent strategy (network architecture) over a strategy-change which involves a radical re-design
of their infrastructure. Furthermore, GE represent solutions found by very simple agents,
which are computationally bounded. We show in Section 2 that such greedy refinements can
be computed efficiently and clarify the relation of GE to other known solution concepts for
NCGs.
Our main contribution follows in Section 3 and Section 4, where we analyze the stability of
solutions found by greedily playing agents. For the Sum version we show the rather surprising
result that, despite the fact that greedy strategy-changes may be sub-optimal from an agent’s
point of view, Sum-GE capture Sum-NE on trees. That is, in any tree network which is in
Sum-GE no agent can decrease her cost by performing any strategy-change. For general
networks we prove that any network in Sum-GE is in 3-approximate Sum-NE and we provide
a lower bound of 32 for this approximation ratio. Hence, we are able to show that greedy play
almost suffices to create perfectly stable networks.
For the Max version we show that these games have a strong non-local flavor which
yields diminished stability. Here even GE-trees may be susceptible to non-greedy improving
strategy-changes. Interestingly, susceptible trees can be fully characterized and we show that
their stability is very close to being perfect. Specifically, we show that any GE-star is in
2-approximate Max-NE and that any GE-tree having larger diameter is in 65 -approximate
Max-NE. We give a matching lower bound for both cases. For non-tree networks in GE
the picture changes drastically. We show that for GE-networks having a very small α the
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approximation ratio is related to their diameter and we provide a lower bound of 4. For α ≥ 1,
we show that there are non-tree networks in Max-GE, which are only in Ω(n)-approximate
Max-NE. The latter result yields that the locality gap of uncapacitated metric min-max
facility location is in Ω(n).
Regarding the complexity of deciding Nash-stability, we show that there are simple poly-
nomial time algorithms for tree networks in both versions. Furthermore, greedy-stability
represents an easy to check certificate for 3-approximate Nash-stability in the Sum version.
2 Greedy Agents and Greedy Equilibria
We consider agents which check three simple ways to improve their current infrastructure.
The three operations are
• greedy augmentation, which is the creation of one new own link,
• greedy deletion, which is the removal of one own link,
• greedy swap, which is a swap of one own link.
Computing the best augmentation/deletion/swap for one agent can be done in O(n2(n+m))
steps by trying all possibilities and re-computing the incurred cost. Observe, that these
smooth strategy-changes induce some kind of organic evolution of the whole network which
seems highly adequate in modeling the Internet. This greedy behavior naturally leads us to
a new solution concept:
Definition 1 (Greedy Equilibrium). (G,α) is in greedy equilibrium if no agent in G can
decrease her cost by buying, deleting or swapping one own edge.
Note, that GE can be understood as solutions which are obtained by a distributed local
search procedure performed by selfish agents.
The next theorem relates GE to other solution concepts in the Sum version. See Fig. 1
for an illustration. Relationships are similar in the Max version.
Theorem 1. For the Sum version it is true that NE ⊂ GE ⊂ ASE and that SE ⊂ ASE.
Furthermore, we have NE\SE 6= ∅, GE\SE 6= ∅, (GE\SE)\NE 6= ∅, (GE\NE) ∩ SE 6= ∅
and NE ∩ GE ∩ SE 6= ∅.
Proof. It is easy to see that Sum-NE ⊆ Sum-ASE and Sum-SE ⊆ Sum-ASE must hold, since
in both cases, we restrict the set of available strategies for the agents. Clearly, greediness
restricts the possible strategies of an agent as well. Hence, we have Sum-NE ⊆ Sum-GE.
Furthermore, by the same argument, if no agent can buy, delete or swap one own edge, then
such a network must be in directed swap equilibrium. It follows that Sum-GE ⊆ Sum-ASE.
Consider the networks depicted in Fig. 1. It follows from Lemma 6 in [3] that any graph
having diameter 2 is in Sum-SE. Thus, (H2, 3), (H3, 3), (H5, 5) ∈ Sum-SE, since the edge-cost
parameter and the edge-ownerships have no influence on the stability in a BNCG. Observe,
that (H1, 7), (H6, 9) /∈ Sum-SE, since any leaf-agent can swap her edge towards a neighbor of
another leaf-agent and thereby strictly decrease her cost. Furthermore, (H4, 3.5) /∈ Sum-SE,
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(H1, 7)
(H6, 9)
(H2, 3)
(H3, 3)
(H5, 5)
(H4, 3.5)
NE
GE
SE
ASE
Fabrikant et al.[9] Alon et al.[3]
Mihala´k & Schlegel[16]
Figure 1: Relations between solution concepts for NCGs in the Sum version. Edge-directions
indicate edge-ownership, edges point away from its owner.
since an agent having distance 3 towards the leaf-agent can decrease her cost by swapping
an edge towards the neighbor of the leaf.
Now we show that a cycle having 5 vertices, C5 for short, is in Sum-GE for any edge
assignment if and only if 1 ≤ α ≤ 4. Since C5 is in Sum-SE, we only have to show that no
agent wants to buy or delete one edge if and only if 1 ≤ α ≤ 4. Since every vertex of C5 has
eccentricity 2, we have that an agent can strictly decrease her cost by buying one edge if and
only if α < 1. On the other hand, since deleting one edge increases the distance-cost of the
moving agent by 4, we have that an agent can strictly decrease her cost by deleting one edge
if and only if α > 4. Thus, (H2, 3), (H3, 3) ∈ Sum-GE and (H5, 5) /∈ Sum-GE.
Next, we show that H1 = H6 is in Sum-GE for 6 ≤ α ≤ 8: For H1 to be in Sum-GE, we
have to make sure that no leaf-vertex can buy an edge and that every cycle-vertex has bought
the best possible edge and cannot be better off by removing that edge or by purchasing one
additional edge. By symmetry of the construction, we can focus on one leaf-vertex l only. A
best possible edge for l is the edge towards a cycle-vertex which has maximum distance to l.
This edge decreases agent l’s distance-cost by 6. Now we consider a cycle-vertex u and again,
by symmetry, it suffices to argue for vertex u. Observe, that agent u cannot remove her edge
towards the neighboring leaf, since this would disconnect the network. If x removes an edge
towards a neighboring cycle-vertex, then agent u’s distance-cost increases by 8. Furthermore,
it is easy to see that no edge-swap can decrease agent u’s cost. Hence, it remains to show
that agent u cannot buy an additional edge and thereby strictly decrease her cost. A best
possible additional edge for u is an edge towards a non-neighboring cycle-vertex, which yields
a distance decrease of 2. Hence, if α > 2, no such additional edge will be bought by u.
Analogously, it is easy to check that H4 is in Sum-GE for 3 ≤ α ≤ 4. If we restrict agents
only to swapping own edges, it follows that (H6, 9) ∈ Sum-ASE \ Sum-GE.
Now, let us investigate (H1, 7). Note, that agents of H1 who do not own any edge cannot
change their strategy to strictly decrease their cost. Hence, we only have to argue that no
cycle-vertex u can unilaterally change her strategy to strictly decrease her cost. By symmetry
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of the construction, if suffices to argue for agent u. Let lu be u’s leaf-neighbor and let w be u’s
cycle-neighbor to which u owns an edge and let v be u’s other cycle-neighbor. Observe, that u
has to buy the edge towards lu in any strategy to ensure connectedness. Hence, we can safely
ignore this edge. Furthermore, since α ≤ 8, removing edge {u,w} does not yield a strict cost
decrease for u. Since (H1, 7) is a greedy equilibrium, we have that u cannot swap edge {u,w}
with some other edge to decrease her cost. It remains to show that u cannot strictly decrease
her cost by removing edge {u,w} and buying at least two edges. First, let us assume that
u can remove edge {u,w} and simultaneously buy two edges {u, x} and {u, y} and thereby
strictly decrease her cost. Observe, that x 6= w and y 6= w must hold, since otherwise the
edge not connecting to w would be a greedy augmentation. Furthermore, it is easy to show
that v 6= x, v 6= y and x 6= y must hold and that x and y cannot be leaves, since leaves are
always dominated by their corresponding cycle-neighbors. Hence, the only possible strategy
for agent u, which satisfies the mentioned constraints, is to buy the edges {u, z1} and {u, z2},
where z1 and z2 are the cycle-vertices which have maximum distance to u. This strategy
yields a distance decrease of 10 compared to buying only edge {u, lu}. Clearly, every edge in
an equilibrium strategy, which is not required for ensuring connectedness of the network must
yield at least a distance decrease of α, since otherwise the agent would be better off without
buying that edge. Since 10 < 2α, we have that agent u’s new cost is strictly higher than u’s
cost in (H1, 7). Observe, that removing {u,w} and buying three edges {u, x}, {u, y}, {u, z},
with x 6= w, y 6= w and z 6= w, yields a distance decrease of 12 < 3α. Hence, agent u cannot
strictly decrease her cost by buying 3 edges. For more than three edges, where no edge is
allowed to connect to w, an analogous argument yields that u cannot strictly decrease her
cost. Hence, agent u cannot change her strategy to strictly decrease her cost. Analogously,
it is easy to check that (H2, 3) ∈ Sum-NE.
The network (H3, 3) /∈ Sum-NE, since the vertex which owns two edges can strictly
decrease her cost by removing both edges and buying one edge towards a vertex in distance 2
in H3. Finally, (H4, 3.5) /∈ Sum-NE, since the agent who owns two edges can strictly decrease
her cost by performing a similar strategy change as the respective agent in (H3, 3).
3 The Quality of Sum Greedy Equilibria
This section is devoted to discussing the quality of greedy equilibrium networks in the Sum
version. We begin with a simple but very useful property.
Lemma 1. If an agent v cannot decrease her cost by buying one edge in the Sum version,
then buying k > 1 edges cannot decrease agent v’s cost.
Proof. Let v be an agent who cannot strictly decrease her cost in network (G,α) by purchasing
one edge. Let q denote the number of edges in (G,α) owned by agent v. Now assume towards a
contradiction that agent v can strictly decrease her cost by purchasing k > 1 edges e1, . . . , ek.
Let (Gk, α) be the network (G,α) augmented by these k edges. Let cv(G,α) and cv(G
k, α)
denote agent v’s cost in (G,α) and (Gk, α), respectively. Hence, we have cv(G
k, α) < cv(G,α).
Let D and Dk denote agent v’s distance-cost in (G,α) and (Gk, α), respectively. We have
cv(G,α) = qα+D and cv(G
k, α) = qα+kα+Dk. Let (G1, α) denote the network (G,α), where
agent v has built the best possible additional edge e∗. That is, there is no other additional
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edge e′, such that agent v can strictly decrease her cost by swapping edge e∗ with edge e′.
Since (G,α) is in greedy equilibrium, we have cv(G
1, α) = qα + α + D1 ≥ cv(G,α), where
cv(G
1, α) denotes agent v’s cost in the network (G1, α) and D1 denotes v’s distance-cost in
(G1, α). Hence, we have
cv(G
k, α) < cv(G,α) ⇐⇒ kα < D −Dk (1)
and
cv(G
1, α) ≥ cv(G,α) ⇐⇒ α ≥ D −D1. (2)
Let gk = D−Dk and g1 = D−D1, that is, gk and g1 denote the distance decrease of agent v
by building edges e1, . . . , ek simultaneously or by building edge e
∗, respectively. For all edges
l ∈ {e1, . . . , ek, e∗}, let gl denote the decrease in distance-cost for agent v if only the edge l is
inserted into network (G,α). Observe, that gk ≤ ge1 + ge2 + · · ·+ gek holds.
By inequality (1) we have that α < g
k
k ≤ g
e1+ge2+···+gek
k . It follows that α < g
ej , for some
1 ≤ j ≤ k, since otherwise we would have α < ge1+ge2+···+gekk ≤ kαk = α. Furthermore, since
e∗ is the best possible additional edge for agent v in (G,α), we have gej ≤ ge∗ . It follows
that α < ge
∗
, which contradicts inequality (2).
3.1 Tree Networks in Sum Greedy Equilibrium
We show that in a NCG all stable trees found by greedily behaving agents are even stable
against any strategy-change. Hence, in case of a tree equilibrium no loss in stability occurs
by greedy play. This is a counter-intuitive result, since for each agent alone being greedy is
clearly sub-optimal (the network in Fig. 2 with α = 6 is an example). Thus, the following
theorem shows the emergence of an optimal outcome out of a combination of sub-optimal
strategies.
Theorem 2. If (T, α) is in Sum-GE and T is a tree, then (T, α) is in Sum-NE.
Before we prove Theorem 2, we first provide some useful observations. The well-known notion
of a 1-median [12] is used: A 1-median of a connected graph G is a vertex x ∈ V (G), where
x ∈ arg minu∈V (G)
∑
w∈V (G) d(u,w).
Lemma 2. Let (T, α) be a tree network in Sum-GE. If agent u owns edge {u,w} in (T, α),
then w must be a 1-median of its tree in the forest T − {u}.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that vertex w is not a 1-median vertex in its respective
tree Tw in the forest T − {u}. Clearly, agent u’s unique shortest paths to all vertices in
V (Tw) in (T, α) traverse vertex w and we have that agent u’s distance-cost within Tw is
|V (Tw)| +
∑
v∈V (Tw) d(w, v). Let x be a 1-median vertex of Tw. By definition, we have that∑
v∈V (Tw) d(x, v) <
∑
v∈V (Tw) d(w, v). Thus, agent u can strictly decrease her distance-cost
within Tw by performing an edge-swap from w towards x. This contradicts the fact that
(T, α) is in Sum-GE.
Let (T, α) be any tree network in Sum-GE and let T u be the forest induced by removing all
edges owned by agent u from T . Let F u be the forest T u without the tree containing vertex
u. The above lemma directly implies the following:
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Corollary 1. Let (T, α) be in Sum-GE, and let F u be defined as above. Agent u’s strategy
in (T, α) is the optimal strategy among all strategies that buy exactly one edge into each tree
of F u.
Let x ∈ V (T ) be a 1-median of the tree T . Let u /∈ V (T ) be a special vertex. We consider
the network (GuT , α), which is obtained by adding vertex u and inserting edge {u, x}, which
is owned by u, in T and by assigning the ownership of all other edges arbitrarily among
the respective endpoints of any other edge in GuT . Furthermore, let y1, . . . , yl denote the
neighbors of vertex x in T and let Tyi , for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, denote the maximal subtree of T which
is rooted at yi and which does not contain vertex x. See Fig. 2 (left) for an illustration. We
x u x ux1
x2
x3
y2
y1
y3
Ty2
Ty1
Ty3
Figure 2: The network (GuT , α) before and after agent u changes her strategy to S
∗
u.
consider a special strategy of agent u in (GuT , α): Let S
∗
u = {x1, . . . , xk} be the best strategy
of agent u which purchases at least two edges. The situation with agent u playing strategy
S∗u is depicted in Fig. 2 (right).
Lemma 3. Let (GuT , α), S
∗
u = {x1, . . . , xk} and the subtrees Tyi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l be specified as
above. There is no subtree Tyi, which contains all vertices x1, . . . , xk.
Proof. We assume towards a contradiction that there is a strategy S∗u buying k > 1 edges
and a subtree Tyi of T such that x1, . . . , xk are vertices of Tyi .
We claim that if this is the case, then there is a strategy S′u which purchases exactly k
edges and which strictly outperforms strategy S∗u, that is, agent u can strictly decrease her
cost by switching from strategy S∗u to strategy S′u. Clearly, this yields a contradiction to S∗u
being the best strategy for agent u.
Consider the vertices x1, . . . , xk induced by strategy S
∗
u. By assumption, all these vertices
are contained in subtree Tyi . Observe, that vertex x does not belong to any subtree Tyj .
We will use the following well-known fact [12] about a 1-median in a tree stated in our
terminology: Vertex x is a 1-median of tree T having n vertices if and only if |V (Tyi)| ≤ n2
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
Let x′ ∈ {x1, . . . , xk} be the vertex having minimum distance to vertex x and let x′′ be
the neighbor of x′ which is closer to x. (Note, that x′′ = x is possible and that x′′ must be a
non-neighbor of u.) Clearly, we have dT (x
′, x) ≥ 1. Let S′u be the strategy S∗u with only one
modification: Vertex x′ is replaced by vertex x′′.
9
We claim that S′u yields strictly less cost for agent u than strategy S∗u. Observe, that since
x is a 1-median we have |V (T ) \ V (Tyi)| ≥ n2 . Hence, the replacement of x′ by x′′ yields a
cost decrease for agent u by at least n2 . On the other hand, this replacement increases agent
u’s cost by at most n2 − 1. This is true, because k > 1 and dT (x′, x′′) = 1 we have that agent
u’s distances to all but one vertices in Tyi can possibly increase by 1. Since we have only
replaced x′ by x′′ all other distances stay the same. Hence, we have that S′u yields strictly
less cost for agent u than strategy S∗u and we have a contradiction.
Next, let us consider two special strategies of agent u. Let S1u be agent u’s best strategy,
which buys at least two edges including one edge towards vertex x. Furthermore, let S2u be
agent u’s best strategy, which buys at least two edges, but no edge towards vertex x.
Lemma 4. Let (GuT , α), S
1
u, S
2
u and vertex x be specified as above. Let xj ∈ S2u be a vertex
which has minimum distance to x among all vertices in S2u. If strategy S
2
u yields less cost for
agent u than strategy S1u, then xj cannot be a leaf of G
u
T .
Proof. We assume towards a contradiction that S2u yields strictly less cost for agent u than
strategy S1u and vertex xj ∈ S2u, which has minimum distance to x among all vertices in S2u,
is a leaf of GuT . Let x
′
j be the unique neighbor of xj . It follows that d(x
′
j , x) = d(xj , x) − 1.
There are two cases:
If d(xj , x) ≥ 2, then let S′u be the strategy S2u, where vertex xj is replaced by vertex x′j .
We claim that agent u can strictly decrease her cost by switching from strategy S2u to strategy
S′u. Observe, that by switching from S2u to S′u, agent u decreases her distance to x and to x′j
by one. On the other hand, only the distance to vertex xj increases by one. Observe, that
|S′u| = |S2u| and x /∈ S′u. Hence, S′u yields strictly less cost for agent u than strategy S2u, which
is a contradiction to the fact that S2u is agent u’s best strategy which buys at least two edges
and no edge towards x.
On the other hand, consider the case where d(xj , x) ≤ 1. Note, that xj 6= x, since x /∈ S2u.
Hence, we have d(xj , x) = 1. Let S
′′
u be the strategy S
2
u, where we replace xj by x. We have
|S2u| = |S′′u| and x ∈ S′′u. Furthermore, since x /∈ S2u, d(xj , x) = 1 and since xj is a leaf, we
have that strategy S′′u yields at most the cost of S2u for agent u. This contradicts the fact
that S2u strictly outperforms S
1
u.
Now we have all the tools we need to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. We will prove the contra-positive statement of Theorem 2. We show
that if an agent u can decrease her cost by performing a strategy-change in a tree network
(T, α) which is in Sum-GE, then there is an agent z in V (T ) who can decrease her cost by
performing a greedy strategy-change. In that case we have a contradiction to (T, α) being in
Sum-GE.
If agent u can decrease her cost by buying, deleting or swapping one own edge, then we
have u = z and we are done. Hence, we assume that agent u cannot decrease her cost by a
greedy strategy-change but by performing an arbitrary strategy-change. We consider agent
u’s strategy-change towards the best possible arbitrary strategy S∗ (if u has more than one
such strategy, then we choose the one which buys the least number of edges). Clearly, agent u
cannot remove any owned edge without purchasing edges, since T is a tree and the removal
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would disconnect T . Furthermore, since (T, α) is in Sum-GE and by Lemma 1, agent u can-
not decrease her cost by purchasing k > 0 additional edges. Hence, the only way agent u can
possibly decrease her cost is by removing j own edges and building k edges simultaneously.
Clearly, k ≥ j must hold. Furthermore, by Corollary 1, it follows that k > j. Let F u be the
forest obtained by removing the j edges owned by agent u from T and let T ∗ be the tree in
F u which contains vertex u. Observe that among the k new edges, there cannot be edges
having an endpoint in T ∗. This is true because (T, α) is in Sum-GE and by Lemma 1. Any
such edge would be a possible greedy augmentation which we assume not to exist. Hence, by
the pigeonhole principle, we have that there must be at least one tree Tq in F
u into which
agent u buys at least two edges with strategy S∗. We focus on Tq and will find agent z within.
Let {u, x}, with x ∈ V (Tq), be the unique edge of T which connects u to the subtree Tq. Hence,
agent u’s strategy-change to S∗ removes edge {u, x} and buys kq > 1 edges {u, x1}, . . . , {u, xkq},
with xj ∈ V (Tq) for 1 ≤ j ≤ kq. Let X = {x1, . . . , xkq}. By Lemma 1, we have xj 6= x,
for xj ∈ X. Let y1, . . . , yl denote the neighbors of vertex x in Tq and let Ty1 , . . . , Tyl be
the maximal subtrees of Tq not containing vertex x, which are rooted at vertex y1, . . . , yl,
respectively. Let xa ∈ X be a vertex of X which has minimum distance to vertex x. Let
Ta ∈ {Ty1 , . . . , Tyl} be the subtree containing xa. By Lemma 3, we have that there is a
subtree Tb ∈ {Ty1 , . . . , Tyl}, with Tb 6= Ta, which contains at least one vertex of X. Let
B = {xb1 , . . . , xbp} = X ∩ V (Tb). Furthermore, since no strategy which buys at least two
edges including an edge towards x into Tq outperforms u’s greedy strategy within Tq and by
Lemma 4, we have that vertex xa cannot be a leaf. That is, there is a vertex z ∈ V (Tq),
which is a neighbor of xa, such that d(z, x) > d(xa, x). We show that agent z can decrease
her cost by buying one edge in (T, α).
First of all, notice that by definition of S∗, we have that each edge {u, xj}, with xj ∈ X,
must independently of the other bought edges yield a distance decrease of more than α for
agent u. Otherwise agent u could remove this edge and obtain a strictly better (or smaller)
strategy, which contradicts the fact that S∗ is the best possible strategy (buying the least
number of edges). Let Dj ⊂ V (Tq) be the set of vertices to which edge {u, xj} is the first
edge on agent u’s unique shortest path. Since xa has minimum distance to x, it follows that
Dr ⊆ V (Tb) for r ∈ {b1, . . . , bp}. The main observation is that agent z faces in some sense
the same situation as agent u with strategy S∗ but without all edges {u, y}, where y ∈ B:
Both have vertex xa as neighbor and their shortest paths to any vertex in Tb all traverse xa
and x. Remember, that each edge {u, y}, for all y ∈ B, yields a distance decrease of more
than α for agent u and that Dr ⊆ V (Tb), for r ∈ {b1, . . . , bp}. Furthermore, removing all
those edges from S∗ yields a strict cost increase for agent u. This implies that agent z can
decrease her cost by buying all edges {z, y}, for y ∈ B, simultaneously. If |B| = 1, then this
strategy-change is a greedy move by agent z which decreases z’s cost. If |B| > 1, then, by
the contra-positive statement of Lemma 1, it follows that there exists one edge {z, y∗}, with
y∗ ∈ B, which agent z can greedily buy to decrease her cost.
3.2 Non-Tree Networks in Sum Greedy Equilibrium
There exist non-tree networks in Sum-GE, since, as shown by Albers et al. [1], there exist non-
tree networks in Sum-NE and we have Sum-NE ⊆ Sum-GE. Having Theorem 2 at hand, one
might hope that this nice property carries over to non-tree greedy equilibria. Unfortunately,
11
this is not true.
Theorem 3. There is a network in Sum-GE which is not in β-approximate Sum-NE for
β < 32 .
Proof. We consider a special family G1, G2, . . . of graphs. The graph Gk is constructed as
follows: We have V (Gk) = {u,w, x, y1, . . . , yk} ∪ {zji | 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k}. Vertex u owns edges
towards y1, . . . , yk, vertex w owns edges towards x and u, each vertex z
j
i owns an edge to x
and yi and the vertices y1, . . . , yk form a clique, with arbitrary edge-ownership. Fig. 3(left)
illustrates this construction for k = 3.
x
y1
y2
y3
z33 z23 z13
z11
z21
z31 z12
z22
z32
w
u x
y1
y2
y3
z33 z23 z13
z11
z21
z31 z12
z22
z32
w
u
Figure 3: The network (Gk, k + 1) for k = 3 and agent u’s best response. Edges point away
from its owner. For k →∞ agent u’s improvement approaches a factor of 32 .
First we show that the network (Gk, k+1) is in Sum-GE and then we show that agent u’s
best strategy yields a cost decrease by a factor of roughly 32 .
Note, that Gk has diameter 2. Since α = k + 1 > 1, it follows that no agent can buy an
edge to decrease her cost. Furthermore, swapping any own edge cannot decrease an agent’s
cost either, since the number of neighbors stays the same. Thus, we only have to argue that
no agent can delete an own edge to decrease her cost. Consider agent u. Deleting edge
{u, yi} increases u’s distances to yi, z1i , . . . , zki by one. Hence, for α = k + 1, this operation
does not decrease agent u’s cost. An agent yi is in essentially the same situation. If yi deletes
her edge {yi, yj}, then yi’s distances to yj , z1j , . . . , zkj increase by one. Thus, agents y1, . . . , yk
cannot delete an edge to decrease their cost. If agent w deletes edge {w, u}, then all distances
towards u, y1, . . . , yk increase by one. Furthermore if w deletes edge {w, x}, then all distances
towards x and all zji , for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k increase by at least one. Thus, agent w cannot delete
an edge to decrease her cost. Finally, consider an agent zji . Deleting edge {zji , x} increases
zji ’s distances to x and all z
q
p, for p 6= i and 1 ≤ q ≤ k. Deleting edge {zji , yi} increases zji ’s
distances to u, y1, . . . , yk by one. Hence, no agent can delete an edge to decrease her cost and
we have that (Gk, k + 1) is in Sum-GE.
Now consider a strategy-change of agent u from strategy Su = {y1, . . . , yk} to strategy
S∗u = {x}, see Fig. 3(right). Let (G∗k, k+ 1) be the network induced by S∗u. We claim that S∗u
is agent u’s best possible strategy. It is easy to see that no other strategy S′u, with |S′u| ≤ 1
outperforms S∗u. Furthermore, note that with strategy S∗u agent u has exactly the k vertices
y1, . . . , yk at distance 3. Any edge {u, yi} yields a cost decrease of exactly k + 1, but since
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α = k + 1, such an edge does not decrease agent u’s cost. Clearly, edges towards a vertex
zji are even worse than edges towards yi. By Lemma 1, we have that even more additional
edges cannot decrease u’s cost. Furthermore, it is easy to see that strategy Su is agent u’s
best possible strategy, which does not buy an edge towards x. We will show that S∗u yields
strictly less cost than Su for agent u, which will settle the claim that S
∗
u is optimal.
Let c(Su, k) and c(S
∗
u, k) denote agent u’s cost in (Gk, k+ 1) and (G
∗
k, k+ 1), respectively.
We have
lim
k→∞
c(Su, k)
c(S∗u, k)
= lim
k→∞
kα+ k + 1 + 2(k2 + 1)
α+ 2 + 2k2 + 3k
= lim
k→∞
3k2 + 2k + 3
2k2 + 4k + 3
=
3
2
.
Thus, for any β < 32 there is a k
′ such that c(Su, k′) > βc(S∗u, k′), which implies that the
Sum-GE (Gk′ , k
′ + 1) is not a β-approximate Sum-NE for β < 32 .
Now let us turn to the good news. We show that Sum-GEs cannot be arbitrarily unstable.
On the contrary, they are very close to Sum-NEs in terms of stability.
Theorem 4. Every network in Sum-GE is in 3-approximate Sum-NE.
Proof. We prove Theorem 4 by providing a “locality gap preserving” reduction to the Un-
capacitated Metric Facility Location problem (UMFL) [18].
Let u be an agent in (G,α) and let Z be the set of vertices in V (G) which own an edge towards
u. Consider the network (G′, α), where all edges owned by agent u are removed. Observe,
that the set Z is the same in (G,α) and (G′, α). Let S = {U | U ⊆ (V (G′)\{u})∧U ∩Z = ∅}
denote the set of agent u’s pure strategies in (G′, α) which do not induce multi-edges or a
self-loop. We transform (G′, α) into an instance I(G′) for UMFL as follows:
Let V (G′) \ {u} = F = C, where F is the set of facilities and C is the set of clients. For
all facilities f ∈ Z ∩ F we define the opening cost to be 0, all other facilities have opening
cost α. Thus, Z is exactly the set of cost 0 facilities in I(G′). For every i, j ∈ F ∪ C we
define dij = dG′(i, j) + 1. If there is no path between i and j in G
′, then we define dij =∞.
Clearly, since the distance in G′ is metric we have that all distances dij in I(G′) are metric
as well. See Fig. 4 for an example.
uba
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a b c d e f
a b c d e f
1 1
1
1
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2
2
2
2
2 2
2
2
2
2
3 3 3
3
Facilities
Clients
α α α α α0
UMFL instance I(G′)
Opening Cost
Network (G′, α)
Figure 4: Network (G′, α) and its corresponding UMFL instance I(G′). Edges between clients
and between facilities are omitted. All other omitted edges have length ∞.
Now, observe that any strategy S ∈ S of agent u in (G′, α) corresponds to the solution of
the UMFL instance I(G′), where exactly the facilities in FS = S ∪ Z are opened and where
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all clients are assigned to their nearest open facility. Moreover, every solution F ′ = X ∪ Z,
where X ⊆ F \Z, for instance I(G′) corresponds to agent u’s strategy X ∈ S in (G′, α). Let
SUMFL = {W ⊆ F | Z ⊆ W} denote the set of all solutions to instance I(G′), which open
at least all cost 0 facilities. Hence, we have a bijection pi : S → SUMFL, with pi(S) = S ∪ Z
and pi−1(X) = X \ Z. Let pi(S) = FS and let (GS , α) denote the network (G′, α), where
agent u has bought all edges towards vertices in S. Let cost(FS) denote the cost of the
solution FS to instance I(G
′). We have that agent u’s cost in (GS , α) is equal to the cost of
the corresponding UMFL solution FS , since
cu(GS , α) = α|S|+
∑
w∈V (GS)\{u}
(
1 + min
x∈S∪Z
dG′(x,w)
)
= α|S|+ 0|Z|+
∑
w∈V (GS)\{u}
min
x∈S∪Z
dxw
= α|FS \ Z|+ 0|Z|+
∑
w∈C
min
x∈FS
dxw = cost(FS).
We claim the following: If agent u plays strategy S ∈ S and cannot decrease her cost
by buying, deleting or swapping one edge in (GS , α), then we have that the cost of the
corresponding solution FS ∈ SUMFL to instance I(G′) cannot be strictly decreased by opening,
closing or swapping one facility.
Proving the above claim suffices to prove Theorem 4. This can be seen as follows: For
UMFL, Arya et al. [4] have already shown that the locality gap of UMFL is 3, that is, that
any UMFL solution in which clients are assigned to their nearest open facility and which
cannot be improved by opening, closing or swapping one facility is a 3-approximation of the
optimum solution.
By construction of I(G′), we have that every facility z ∈ Z is the unique facility which is
nearest to some client w ∈ C. Thus, we have that in any locally optimal and any globally
optimal UMFL solution to I(G′) all cost 0 facilities must be open, since otherwise such a
solution can be improved by opening a cost 0 facility. Hence, every locally or globally optimal
solution to I(G′) has a corresponding strategy of agent u which yields the same cost. Using
the claim and the result by Arya et al. [4], it follows that if agent u cannot decrease her cost
by buying, deleting or swapping an edge in (GS , α) then we have cu(GS , α) ≤ 3cu(GS∗ , α),
where S∗ is agent u’s optimal (non-greedy) strategy in (G′, α) and (GS∗ , α) the network
induced by S∗.
Now we prove the claim. Let pi(S) = FS . We have already shown that cu(GS , α) = cost(FS).
Furthermore, we have Z ⊆ FS . We prove the contra-positive statement of the claim. Assume
that solution FS can be improved by opening, closing or swapping one facility. Let F
′
S be
this locally improved solution and let cost(F ′S) < cost(FS). Note, that Z ⊆ F ′S must hold.
This is true, since by construction of I(G′) closing a cost 0 facility increases the cost of
any solution to I(G′). Hence, no facility z ∈ Z can be included in a closing or swapping
operation. It follows that the strategy S′ := pi−1(F ′S) exists. Observe, that S = FS \ Z
and S′ = F ′S \ Z must differ by one element. Furthermore, by cost-equality, we have that
cu(GS′ , α) = cost(F
′
S) < cost(FS) = cu(GS , α). Hence, agent u can buy, delete or swap one
edge in (GS , α) to decrease her cost.
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4 The Quality of Max Greedy Equilibria
In this section, we discuss the stability of networks in Max-GE. We will start by showing
that operations of buying, deleting and swapping edges each may have a strong non-local
flavor. See Fig. 5 for an illustration.
Lemma 5. For k ≥ 2 there is a network (G,α), where an agent can decrease her cost by
buying/deleting/swapping k edges but not by buying/deleting/swapping j < k edges.
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Figure 5: The networks and strategy-changes for k = 5.
Proof. We consider each operation separately:
• Buying k edges versus buying j < k edges: Let G be a star having n = k + 2 vertices
and let agent u be a leaf vertex. See Fig. 5(left). Furthermore, let α < 1n−2 . Let x be
the center of the star. If agent u owns the edge {u, x}, then we have cu(G) = α + 2,
otherwise, we have cu(G) = 2. Now, observe, that u has exactly k vertices at maximum
distance 2. Hence, buying j < k edges does not decrease agent u’s maximum distance to
any vertex. On the other hand, if u buys k = n−2 edges to all distance 2 vertices, then
agent u’s distance cost decreases by 1 while agent u’s edge cost increases by kα < 1.
Thus, buying k edges yields a strict cost decrease for agent u.
• Deleting k edges versus deleting j < k edges: Let G be a clique having n = k + 2
vertices and let u be an agent who owns all but one of her k + 1 incident edges. See
Fig. 5(middle). Let 1n−2 < α ≤ 1n−3 . Observe, that cu(G) = kα + 1. If agent u
deletes j < k edges, then u’s distance cost increases by 1 while u’s edge cost decreases
by jα ≤ 1. Thus, deleting j < k edges does not decrease agent u’s cost. On the
other hand, if u deletes k edges, then u distance cost increases by 1 while u’s edge cost
decreases by kα > 1. Hence, deleting k edges decreases agent u’s cost.
• Swapping k edges versus swapping j < k edges: Let G = (V,E) be a star-like graph
which is defined as follows: Vertex x is the center of the star and we have k triples
of vertices xi, yi, zi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Let E = {(x, ai), (ai, bi), (bi, ci) | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}. See
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Fig. 5(right). Observe, that agent x cannot decrease her cost by swapping j < k edges
simultaneously, since each edge must connect to the same subtree of x. In contrast to
this, agent x can decrease her cost by performing the multi-swap, where every edge
(x, ai) is replaced by the edge (x, bi). Note, that this multi-swap decreases agent x’s
distance-cost by 1 while having the same edge cost.
Having seen Lemma 5, it should not come as a surprise that greedy local optimization may
get stuck at sub-optimal states of the game.
4.1 Tree Networks in Max Greedy Equilibrium
The examples on the left and right side of Fig. 5 already show that there are tree networks,
which are in Max-GE but not in Max-NE. In the following we show that this undesired
behavior is restricted only to two families of tree networks in Max-GE. That is, we provide
a characterization of all tree networks in Max-GE which are not in Max-NE. Furthermore,
we show tight bounds on the stability for both mentioned families which are very close to
the optimum. We start by introducing the main actors: Cheap Stars and Badly Connected
Trees.
Definition 2 (Cheap Star). A network (T, α) in Max-GE is called a Cheap Star, if T is a
star having at least n ≥ 4 vertices and α < 1n−2 . Furthermore, the ownership of all edges in
T is arbitrary.
Definition 3 (Badly Connected Tree). A tree network (T, α) in Max-GE is a Badly Con-
nected Tree if there is an agent u ∈ V (T ) who can decrease her cost by swapping k > 1 own
edges simultaneously.
Intuitively, Cheap Stars owe their instability to a multi-buy operation, whereas Badly Con-
nected Trees owe their instability to a multi-swap operation. Observe that Cheap Stars have
diameter 2 and that Badly Connected Trees have diameter at least 3. Hence, these families
are disjunct. The following theorem shows that Cheap Stars and Badly Connected Trees are
the only tree networks in Max-GE which are not in Max-NE.
Theorem 5. Let (T, α) be a network in Max-GE, where T is a tree. The network (T, α) is
in Max-NE if and only if it is not a Cheap Star or a Badly Connected Tree.
The proof of Theorem 5 is based on the following two observations.
Lemma 6. Let (T, α) be a tree network in Max-GE having diameter at most 2. If (T, α) is
not in Max-NE, then (T, α) is a Cheap Star.
Lemma 7. Let (T, α) be a tree network in Max-GE having diameter at least 3. If (T, α) is
not in Max-NE, then (T, α) is a Badly Connected Tree.
We start with proving Lemma 6.
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Proof of Lemma 6. Trivially, any tree network having diameter at most 1 must be in Max-
NE. Hence, we focus on diameter 2 tree networks which are in Max-GE but not in Max-NE.
Note, that every tree network in Max-GE which has diameter 2 is stable against multi-swap
operations. This is easy to see, since leaves can own at most one edge and the unique non-leaf
vertex (the center of the star) has already optimal distance cost of 1. Since edge deletions lead
to a disconnected network, it follows that the instability against arbitrary strategy-changes
must be due to a multi-buy operation of a leaf agent. If T has at most 3 vertices, then any
leaf can buy at most one additional edge, which represents a greedy operation. Hence, T
must have at least 4 vertices. Since T is a star, we have that any leaf l has exactly n − 2
vertices in distance 2. Thus, to strictly decrease her distance cost, agent l must buy all edges
towards these n− 2 non-neighbors. It follows that such a multi-buy operation yields a strict
cost decrease for agent l, if α < 1n−2 . This matches exactly the definition of a Cheap Star and
implies that Cheap Stars are the only possible diameter 2 tree networks in Max-GE which
are not in Max-NE.
For proving Lemma 7, we first need some additional observations.
Lemma 8. If (T, α) is a tree network in Max-GE having diameter at least 3, then α ≥ 1.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that there is a tree network (T, α), which is in Max-
GE and has diameter at least 3 and where α < 1. There are two cases:
If every leaf of T is a neighbor of a 1-center of T , then, since T has diameter at least 3,
there must be two 1-center vertices of T and T has diameter exactly 3. It is easy to see that
any tree can have at most two 1-center vertices. Thus, we have that T must be a “double-
star”. Let x, y be the two 1-center vertices of T and let l be a leaf which is a neighbor of x.
Since y is a 1-center, there must be a leaf z which is a neighbor of y and where dT (l, z) = 3. If
agent l buys the edge {l, y}, then l’s edge cost increases by α but her distance cost decreases
by 1. Since α < 1, this yields a strict cost decrease for agent l and we have a contradiction
to (T, α) being in Max-GE.
If not all leaves of T have a neighboring 1-center vertex, then let l be one such leaf
which has the maximum distance to any 1-center in T . Let x be this 1-center vertex and let
dT (l, x) = k ≥ 2. Let Dl be the set of vertices which have maximum distance to vertex l in
T . Since l has maximum distance to x and x is a 1-center of T , it follows that x lies on all
shortest paths from l to any vertex in Dl. Thus, if agent l buys the edge {l, x}, she reduces
her distance cost by at least 1 while increasing her edge cost by α < 1. This yields a strict
cost decrease for agent l and again we have a contradiction to (T, α) being in Max-GE.
Lemma 9. Let (G,α) be any network in Max-GE which is not in Max-NE. Let u be any
player who can strictly decrease her cost by performing a non-greedy strategy-change towards
strategy S∗u. If α ≥ 1, then agent u’s distance cost induced by strategy S∗u is at least 2.
Proof. Let Su be agent u’s current strategy in (G,α) and let cost(u) = edge(u) + dist(u)
denote agent u’s cost, where edge(u) and dist(u) denote u’s edge cost and distance cost
in (G,α), respectively. Clearly, we have dist(u) > 1, since otherwise u can improve on
her current strategy only by deleting edges, which yields an increase in distance cost by
at least 1. We assume towards a contradiction that agent u can perform a strategy-change
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towards strategy S∗u, which yields a strict cost decrease and where dist∗(u) = 1. Here dist∗(u)
is agent u’s distance cost induced by strategy S∗u and cost∗(u) = edge∗(u) + dist∗(u) denotes
u’s new cost. It is easy to see that |S∗u| > |Su| must hold, since agent u cannot possibly bring
her distance cost down to 1 by performing a multi-swap. Consider agent u’s shortest path in
(G,α) towards a vertex having maximum distance to u. Clearly, this path has length dist(u).
Since S∗u yields dist∗(u) = 1, it follows that u must buy an edge to all vertices on this path.
Hence, agent u must buy at least dist(u)−1 many additional edges to achieve distance cost of
1. But, since α ≥ 1, this yields that edge∗(u) ≥ edge(u)+(dist(u)−1)α ≥ edge(u)+dist(u)−1.
Hence, we have that cost∗(u) = edge∗(u) + dist∗(u) ≥ edge∗(u) + dist(u)− 1 + 1 ≥ edge(u) +
dist(u) = cost(u), which is a contradiction to the fact that S∗u strictly decreases agent u’s
cost.
Now we are ready for the proof of Lemma 7.
Proof of Lemma 7. Let (T, α) be any tree network in Max-GE, where T has diameter at
least 3. Note, that by Lemma 8, it follows that α ≥ 1.
We claim that if there is an agent u in V (T ) with strategy Su who can strictly decrease
her cost by changing to a strategy S∗u, where |Su| < |S∗u|, then there must be a player p who
can strictly decrease her cost by buying one edge. This yields a contradiction to (T, α) being
in Max-GE.
Observe, that in a tree network, no player can change to a strategy which involves buying
less edges than before, since such a change would disconnect the network. Proving the
above claim suffices to prove the Lemma, since Badly Connected Trees are exactly those tree
networks in Max-GE, where one agent v with strategy Sv can strictly decrease her cost by
performing a multi-swap, that is, agent v can change to a strategy S∗v , where |Sv| = |S∗v |.
Now we prove the claim. Let u be an agent with strategy Su who can strictly decrease
her cost by changing to strategy S∗u, with |Su| < |S∗u|. Let x1, . . . , xl denote the neighbors of
u in T and let Txi denote the maximal subtree rooted at xi which does not contain u, for all
1 ≤ i ≤ l. Let k = |S∗u| − |Su| denote the number of additional edges purchased by agent u
with her new strategy. Since we assume that S∗u yields a strict cost decrease for agent u, it
follows that S∗u must decrease agent u’s distance cost by more than kα. Let Du denote the
set of vertices of T which have maximum distance to u and let dist(u) denote this distance.
Furthermore, let dist∗(u) denote agent u’s maximum distance induced by strategy S∗u. By
Lemma 9, it follows that 2 ≤ dist∗(u) < dist(u)−kα, which yields dist(u) ≥ bkαc+3. There
are two cases:
1. Du 6⊂ V (Tv), for any v ∈ {x1, . . . , xl}. In this case there are two vertices p, q, where
p ∈ V (Txi) and q ∈ V (Txj ), for some i 6= j, and we have dist(u) = dT (u, p) = dT (u, q).
Since T is a tree, it follows that dT (p, q) = 2dist(u) and that q ∈ Dp, where Dp is the
set of vertices of T which have maximum distance to p. Observe, that p has distance at
most 2dist(u) − 2 to any other vertex in Txi . This implies that vertex u lies on agent
p’s shortest paths to any vertex of Dp. If agent p buys the edge {p, u}, then agent p’s
distance to all vertices which are not in V (Txi) decreases by dist(u)−1 ≥ bkαc+2 > α.
Furthermore, edge {p, u} yields that agent p’s distance to any vertex in V (Txi) is at most
1 +dist(u). Since dist(u) > kα+ 2 and k ≥ 1 it follows that 1 +dist(u) < 2dist(u)−α.
Thus we have that edge {p, u} increases agent p’s edge cost by α but at the same time
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it decreases her distance cost by more than α, which is a contradiction to (T, α) being
in Max-GE.
2. Du ⊂ V (Tv), for some v ∈ {x1, . . . , xl}. Consider agent p ∈ Du, for which dT (u, p) =
dist(u) ≥ bkαc+3 holds. Since Du ⊂ V (Tv) we have that dT (u,w) ≤ dist(u)−1, for all
w ∈ V (T ) \ V (Tv). Hence, on the one hand we have that agent p’s maximum distance
in T to any vertex in V (Tv) is at most 2dist(u) − 2. On the other hand, agent p’s
maximum distance in T to any vertex in V (T ) \V (Tv) is at most 2dist(u)− 1. If agent
p buys the edge {p, v}, then we have that her maximum distance to any vertex in V (Tv)
decreases by dist(u) − 2 ≥ bkαc + 1 > α. For any other vertex q ∈ V (T ) \ V (Tv), we
have that edge {p, v} yields a distance of at most 1 + dist(u) between p and q. Since
dist(u) > kα + 2 and k ≥ 1 we have 1 + dist(u) < 2dist(u) − 1 − α. Hence, edge
{p, v} increases agent p’s edge cost by α but it decreases agent p’s maximum distance
by more than α, which implies that p can greedily buy the edge {p, v} and thereby
strictly decrease her cost. This is a contradiction to (T, α) being in Max-GE.
Finally, we can set out for proving Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 5. If a Max-GE tree network (T, α) is a Cheap Star, then by definition
of a Cheap Star, there is a leaf-agent who can strictly decrease her cost by buying edges
to all non-neighboring vertices. Clearly, this implies that a Cheap Star cannot be in Max-
NE. Furthermore, by definition of a Badly Connected Tree, we have that in every such tree
network, there is an agent who can strictly decrease her cost by swapping k > 1 edges
simultaneously, which implies that such networks are not in Max-NE. Hence, it remains to
show that Cheap Stars and Badly Connected Trees are the only tree networks which can be
in Max-GE and at the same time not in Max-NE.
On the one hand, by Lemma 6, we have that for Max-GE tree networks having at most
diameter 2 Cheap Stars are the only tree networks which are not in Max-NE. On the other
hand, by Lemma 7, it follows that among all Max-GE tree networks having diameter at least
3 only Badly Connected Trees are not in Max-NE. Since this case distinction covers every
possible diameter, the Theorem follows.
We can use the characterization provided by Theorem 5 to “circumvent” the hardness of
deciding whether a tree network is in Max-NE.
Theorem 6. For every tree network (T, α) it can be checked in O(n4) many steps whether
(T, α) is in Max-NE.
Proof. We can check whether a tree network (T, α) is in Max-NE as follows: First, we
compute whether (T, α) is in Max-GE. If this test fails, then, since Max-GEs are a super
class of Max-NEs, we have that (T, α) is not in Max-NE. On the other hand, if (T, α) is in
Max-GE, then we have to check whether (T, α) is a Cheap Star or a Badly Connected Tree.
If (T, α) is not a Cheap Star and not a Badly Connected Tree, then, by Theorem 5, we have
that (T, α) must be in Max-NE. Otherwise, (T, α) is not in Max-NE.
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Computing whether (T, α) is in Max-GE can be done in O(n4) steps by checking for
every agent if she can strictly decrease her cost by either swapping or buying one own edge.
We can neglect edge deletions since such an operation disconnects the network. An agent
may own Ω(n) may edges, which implies that at most O(n2) many edge-swaps are possible.
Computing the incurred cost of a strategy can be done in linear time by performing a modified
breath first search of the tree network. Since there are O(n) many possible edge purchases
per agent, it follows that we can check in O(n3) steps, if an agent can decrease her cost by
performing a greedy strategy change.
Checking if (T, α) is a Cheap Star is possible in O(n) steps, since we only have to compute
the diameter of T and checking if n and α have the right size. Computing whether (T, α)
is a Badly Connected Tree is more involved since we have to check if there is an agent who
can perform a multi-swap to strictly decrease her cost. This can be done by computing for
every agent u the vertices having the maximum distance to u, checking if u owns all edges
towards the respective subtrees of T and by computing the 1-centers [11] of those subtrees.
Finally, by checking if all edges towards subtrees which contain maximum distance vertices
do not connect to a 1-center of that subtree it can be decided whether agent u can perform
a multi-swap which decreases her cost. Computing the vertices having maximum distance
to u can be done by a breath first search. Furthermore, there are linear time algorithms for
computing the 1-center of an vertex-unweighted tree - see for example the work of Kariv and
Hakimi [11]. Hence, we have that checking if agent u can perform a multi-swap to decrease
her cost can be done in O(n) steps.
In total this yields O(n4) steps for deciding whether (T, α) is in Max-NE.
We are interested in the stability of tree networks in Max-GE. By Theorem 5, we only have
to analyze the stability of Cheap Stars and Badly Connected Trees to get bounds on the
stability on any tree network in Max-GE.
Lemma 10. Every Cheap Star is in 2-approximate Max-NE. Furthermore, this bound is
tight.
Proof. We consider any Cheap Star (T, α). Since Cheap Stars have at least 4 vertices, we
have that V (T ) consists of x, the center of the star, and at least 3 leaves v1, v2 and v3. Let
the edge ownership be arbitrary. Analogously to the proof of Lemma 5, we have that no
leaf agent of T can buy one edge to decrease her cost. Let Sv1 denote agent v1’s strategy
in (T, α). Let S∗v1 be v1’s strategy which buys all edges towards all non-neighbors in T . We
claim that S∗v1 is agent v1’s best strategy. Since every Cheap Star is in Max-GE, we have
that agent v1 cannot delete or swap one edge to decrease her cost. Since she owns at most
one edge in (T, α), this rules out all deletion and swapping operations. Analogously to the
proof of Lemma 5, buying exactly one edge does not decrease player x1’s cost either. Note,
that since α < 1n−2 < 1, we have that no strategy which yields distance cost of 2 can have
strictly less cost than Sv1 . Hence, the claim follows.
Let cost(v1) and cost
∗(v1) denote agent v1’s cost induced by strategy Sv1 and S∗v1 , respec-
tively. We have
lim
α→0
cost(v1)
cost∗(v1)
= lim
α→0
2
(n− 2)α+ 1 = limα→0
α+ 2
(n− 2)α+ 1 = 2.
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Thus, independently of the ownership of edge {v1, x}, we have that the approximation ratio
approaches 2 as α tends to 0. Clearly, this also represents a tight lower bound of 2 on this
ratio.
Lemma 11. Every Badly Connected Tree is in 65 -approximate Max-NE. Furthermore, this
bound is tight.
Proof. Remember, that Badly Connected Trees are exactly those tree networks in Max-GE,
where an agent u can strictly decrease her cost by performing a multi-swap. Clearly, any
multi-swap does not change agent u’s edge cost. Thus, to maximize the ratio between agent
u’s cost in the Badly Connected Tree (T, α) and u’s cost after the best possible multi-swap,
we have to consider a Badly Connected Tree, where agent u can decrease her distance cost as
much as possible. By definition of a Badly Connected Tree, we have that agent u has at least
two vertices p and q in maximum distance dist(u) and we know that p and q lie in different
subtrees of u. Observe that, since T is a tree, agent u owns exactly one edge towards each
subtree which contains maximum distance vertices. To ensure connectedness of the network,
agent u must swap those edges only within their respective subtree. It follows that the best
possible multi-swap connects to the middle vertex of the shortest paths to all maximum
distance vertices. Let dist∗(u) be agent u’s distance after her best possible multi-swap. It
follows that dist∗(u) ≥ 1 +
⌈
dist(u)−1
2
⌉
≥
⌈
dist(u)
2
⌉
.
Let (T, α) be a Badly Connected Tree, which contains an agent u, with dist(u) = k and
where u owns j ≥ 2 edges. We have
cost(u)
cost∗(u)
≤ jα+ k
jα+
⌈
k
2
⌉ ≤ 2α+ k
2α+
⌈
k
2
⌉ .
Note, that this ratio is maximized for a Badly Connected Tree (T ∗, α), where an agent
u ∈ V (T ∗) can decrease her distance cost from k to ⌈k2⌉ and where α is as small as possible.
However, we cannot simply choose α = 1 since we have to ensure that (T ∗, α) remains in
Max-GE.
We explicitly construct (T ∗, α), which will serve at the same time as lower and upper
bound construction. Clearly, T ∗ must consist of a path P of length 2k, where agent u is the
middle vertex of this path. Without loss of generality, we can choose an odd k. Furthermore,
to avoid greedy edge swaps, we assume that all ownership-arcs are directed from u towards
the leaves of P . That is, for every edge {x, y} in P we have that x owns {x, y} if x is closer
to u than y. Thus, on path P we have that u is the only agent who owns two edges. Now,
observe, that (P, α) is already stable against greedy deletions and greedy swaps. No agent
x ∈ V (P ) can swap any single edge to decrease her cost, since the only owned edge is by
construction an edge which does not lie on all shortest paths from x to the vertices having
maximum distance to x. However, agents may improve their cost by buying one additional
edge if α is small enough. To rule out this possibility, we consider a leaf agent l and choose
α in such a way that l cannot decrease her cost by buying one edge. Note, that leaf agents
have the largest distance cost in P , which implies that they are exactly those agents which
are most susceptible to single edge purchases. Thus, if no leaf agent can decrease her cost by
buying one edge, then no other agent can.
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Let l1 and l2 be the to leaf agents of P . Observe, that l1’s best possible additional edge
connects to some vertex z which lies on the path between u and l2. Hence, this edge decreases
agent l1’s distance cost by at least k−1. We choose α such that it will neutralize this decrease
in distance cost. It follows that to minimize α, we have to ensure that z is as close as possible
to u. We force z towards u by adding two branches to P as follows: Let p1 and p2 denote
the vertices which lie in the middle of the path from u to l1 and l2, respectively. Thus, we
have dP (u, p1) = dP (u, p2) =
⌈
k
2
⌉
. To finally obtain T ∗, we connect both vertices p1, p2 to a
path of length
⌈
k
2
⌉− 1, respectively. Again, the ownership on these paths resembles the edge
ownership on P , that is, the respective vertex closer to u owns the edge. Let l′1 and l′2 be
the leaves of the newly attached paths. Note, that these new paths do not change agent u’s
distance decrease. See Fig. 6 for an illustration.
u
l1
l′1
l2
l′2
p1 p2
u
l1
l′1
l2
l′2
p1 p2
Figure 6: The network (T ∗, α) for k = 7 before and after agent u’s best multi-swap.
In T ∗, we have that dT ∗(l1, l′1) = k−1. It follows that every possible additional edge of agent
l1 only yields a distance decrease of at most k + 1. Thus, setting α ≥ k + 1, implies that no
agent in T ∗ can decrease her cost by buying one edge.
Now we are ready to finally settle the approximation ratio of Badly Connected Trees. For
agent u in (T ∗, α) we have
6
5
= lim
k→∞
2(k − 1) + k
2(k − 1) + ⌈k2⌉ ≥ limk→∞ cost(u)cost∗(u) ≥ limk→∞ 2(k + 1) + k2(k + 1) + ⌈k2⌉ = 65 ,
where the limit on the left side represents the upper bound with α = k − 1 and the limit on
the right represents the lower bound with α = k + 1. Both bounds match if we let k tend to
infinity.
Combining Theorem 5 with Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 we arrive at the following:
Theorem 7. Let (T, α) be a tree network in Max-GE. If T has diameter at most 2, then
(T, α) is in 2-approximate Max-NE. If T has diameter at least 3, then (T, α) is in 65 -
approximate Max-NE. Moreover, both bounds are tight.
4.2 Non-Tree Networks in Max Greedy Equilibrium
Fig. 5 (middle) shows that there are non-tree networks inMax-GE, which are not inMax-NE.
We want to quantify the loss in stability of Max-GEs versus Max-NEs. For tree networks we
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have that Cheap Stars play a crucial role. These networks owe their instability to a multi-buy
operation and to the fact that they are in Max-GE for arbitrarily small α. We generalize
this property of Cheap Stars to non-tree networks.
Definition 4 (Cheap Network). A network (G,α) in Max-GE, is called a Cheap Network,
if (G,α) remains in Max-GE when α tends to 0.
Cheap Stars yield a lower bound on the stability approximation ratio which equals their
diameter. We can generalize this observation:
Theorem 8. If there is Cheap Network (G,α) having diameter d, then there is an α∗ such
that the network (G,α∗) is in Max-GE but not in β-approximate Max-NE for any β < d.
Proof. Consider a Cheap Network (G,α), where G has diameter d and let u be any vertex
of G having eccentricity d. Let j denote the number of edges, which are owned by agent u
in (G,α). Thus, we have that agent u has cost jα+ d. Now we consider the strategy change
of agent u towards the strategy which buys an edge to all vertices of G which do not own an
edge to u. Clearly, after the strategy change agent u incurs cost at most (n− 1)α+ 1.
Now, observe that since (G,α) is a Cheap Network, we have that (G,α) remains in Max-
GE when α tends to 0. Hence, limα→0 jα+d(n−1)α+1 = d, which implies that for all β < d there
is an α∗ such that jα∗ + d > β(n − 1)α∗ + 1. Hence, (G,α∗) is in Max-GE but not in
β-approximate Max-NE for any β < d.
Lemma 12. There is a Cheap Network having diameter 4.
Proof. We construct the Cheap Network (G˜, α) as follows: The graph G˜ has 24 vertices
u0, . . . , u7, v0, . . . , v7, w0, . . . , w7 and the vertices u0, . . . , u7 form a cycle, where ui owns the
edge towards ui+1, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 6, and u7 owns the edge to u0. Furthermore, for 0 ≤ j ≤ 7 we
have that agent vj owns an edge to uj and wj and agent wj owns an edge towards uk, where
k = (j + 4) mod 8. See Fig. 7 for an illustration.
For showing that (G˜, α) is a Cheap Network, we have to show that it is in Max-GE for some
α and that it remains in Max-GE if α tends to 0. We begin by proving that (G˜, α) is in
Max-GE for α = 1.
Since (G˜, 1) is highly symmetric, it suffices to show that agents u0, v0 and w0 cannot
strictly decrease their cost by performing a greedy strategy change. It is easy to see that
none of them can decrease her cost by deleting one own edge, since any such deletion increases
the respective agent’s distance cost by at least 1. Since α = 1, this does not yield a strict
cost decrease.
Next, we show that none of the three agents can swap or buy an own edge and thereby
strictly decrease her cost. Consider agent u0, who owns exactly one edge. Now, observe, that
u0’s edge {u0, u1} is the first edge on u0’s shortest paths to the vertices w1 and v5 to which
u0 has maximum distance. Furthermore, observe, that there is no vertex in G˜ which is a
neighbor to both w1 and v5. Thus, no swap can simultaneously decrease agent u0’s distance
to w1 and v5. Agent u0 also has vertex w2 in maximum distance 3. Since dG˜(w1, w2) = 4, it
follows that u0 cannot buy any edge, which strictly decreases u0’s distances to both w1 and
w2 simultaneously. Hence, u0 cannot greedily purchase an edge to strictly decrease her cost.
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u0 u1
u2
u3
u4u5
u6
u7
v0 v1
v2
v3
v4v5
v6
v7
w1
w2
w3
w4w5
w6
w7
w0
Figure 7: The Cheap Network (G˜, 1) having diameter 4.
Agent v0 has, among others, vertices v2, v3, v5 and v6 in maximum distance 4. We have
dG˜(v2, v3) = dG˜(v5, v6) = 3 and dG˜(v2, v5) = dG˜(v3, v6) = 4. Thus, the best possible swap or
edge purchase of v0, which strictly decreases the distances from v0 to v2 and v3 simultaneously,
must connect to a neighbor x of v2 or v3. It follows that either dG˜(x, v5) ≥ 3 or dG˜(x, v6) ≥ 3.
Thus, such a swap or edge purchase does not reduce v0’s distances to all of the four vertices
v2, v3, v5, v6. Any improving swap or edge purchase must strictly decrease v0’s distance cost,
which implies that such an edge must connect to a neighbor of v2 or v3, since this is the only
way to decrease the distance to both of them. It follows that v0 cannot swap or buy any own
edge to decrease her cost.
Agent w0 has the vertices v1, v2.v6 and v7 in maximum distance 4. We have dG˜(v1, v2) =
dG˜(v6, v7) = 3 and dG˜(v1, v6) = dG˜(v2, v7) = 4. Hence, w0 faces essentially the same situation
as v0 and an analogous argument shows that w0 cannot swap or buy an edge to decrease her
cost. This shows that (G˜, 1) is in Max-GE.
We have argued above that any edge deletion increases the distance cost of the moving
agent by 1. Furthermore, we have shown that no swap or edge purchase can strictly decrease
any agent’s distance cost. This implies that (G˜, α) is in Max-GE for any α ≤ 1. Hence
(G˜, α) is a Cheap Network having diameter 4.
Remark 1. The Cheap Network (G˜, α) is not only stable against greedy strategy changes, it is
even stable against any strategy change. That is, (G˜, α) is in Max-NE for any α ≤ 1. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first known non-tree Max-NE network having diameter 4.
Corollary 2. For α < 1 there is a network (G,α) in Max-GE, which is not in β-approximate
Max-NE for any β < 4.
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Now we consider the case, where α ≥ 1. Quite surprisingly, it turns out that this case yields
a very high lower bound on the approximation ratio.
Theorem 9. For α ≥ 1 there is a Max-GE network (G,α) having n vertices, which is not
in β-approximate Max-NE for any β < n−15 .
We give a family of networks in Max-GE each having an agent u who can decrease her
cost by a factor of n−15 by a non-greedy strategy-change. The network (G1, α) can be obtained
as follows: V (G1) = {u, v, l1, l2, a1, a2, b1, b2, x1, y1} and agent u owns edges to a1, a2 and x1.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, agent bi owns an edge to v and to ai and agent li owns an edge to bi. Finally,
agent y1 owns an edge to x1 and to v. Fig. 8 (left) provides an illustration. To get the k-th
member of the family, for k ≥ 2, we simply add the vertices xj , yj , for 2 ≤ j ≤ k, and let
agent yj own edges towards xj and v. See Fig. 8 (right).
u
a2 x1a1
b1 b2 y1
v
l1 l2
u
a2 x1a1
b1 b2 y1
v
l1 l2
u
a2 x1a1
b1 b2 y1
v
l1 l2
x2
y2
xk
yk
. . .
. . .
Figure 8: (G1, α) before (left) and after (middle) agent u’s non-greedy strategy change and
the network (Gk, α) (right).
Lemma 13. Each of the networks (Gi, α), as described above, is in Max-GE for 1 ≤ α ≤ 2.
Proof. The statement is proven as follows: If any agent of (G1, α) deletes one own edge,
then either this operation disconnects the network or her distance cost increases by 2. Since
deleting an own edge decreases the edge cost by α ≤ 2, we have that such a move cannot
yield a strict cost decrease for any agent.
Next, we show that no agent can swap an own edge to strictly decrease her cost. Clearly,
agents a1, a2, v and x1, . . . , xk cannot swap any edge since they do not own one. By symmetry
of the construction, we only have to show that agents u, b1, l1 and y1 cannot decrease their
cost by swapping one own edge. Agent u has vertices l1, l2 and v in maximum distance 3. But
since dGk(l1, l2) = 4 it is impossible for u to swap any own edge such that the distance to all
three of them is strictly decreased. Agent b1 has vertices l2, a2 and x1 in maximum distance
3. But since dGk(l2, x1) = 4, no swap can decrease b1’s distance to all of them. Analogously,
the same holds true for agent y1, who has l1, l2, a1 and a2 in maximum distance 3. Agent l1
cannot improve by swapping her edge, since b1 is a 1-center vertex of the graph Gk − l1 and
for a leaf vertex it is clearly optimal to connect to a 1-center of the remaining network.
Finally, let us focus on greedy edge purchases in (Gk, α). Since α ≥ 1, it follows that
greedily buying one edge can strictly decrease an agent’s cost only if this operation decreases
the distance cost of that agent by more than α, that is, by at least 2. Clearly, for all agents
of (Gk, α) which have eccentricity 3, this is impossible. Now we consider all other agents,
which all have eccentricity 4 and we show that none of them can buy an edge to decrease
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her distance cost by more than 1. By symmetry, it suffices to argue for agents l1, a1 and
x1. Agent l1 has vertices l2 and x1 in maximum distance 4. To decrease both distances
simultaneously, agent l1 must buy an edge towards a vertex, which lies on both shortest
paths from l1 to l2 and from l1 to x1. Indeed, vertex v is such a vertex and it is easy to see
that it is the only non-neighbor of l1, which lies on both shortest paths. But buying an edge
towards v decreases l1’s distance cost only by 1. Agent a1 only has vertex l2 in maximum
distance 4. There are two shortest paths from a1 to l2 which both use vertex b2. However,
buying an edge towards b2 only yields a distance decrease of 1 for agent a1. The same holds
true for an edge towards a2 or v, respectively. Thus, no edge to any non-neighboring vertex
on a1’s shortest paths to l2 can decrease a1’s distance cost by more than 1. Agent x1 has
vertices l1 and l2 in maximum distance 4. But, analogously to agent l1’s situation, there is
no vertex which simultaneously lies on a shortest path from x1 to l1 and on a shortest path
from x1 to l2 and which has distance 1 to l1 and l2. Thus, agent x1 can decrease her distance
cost by buying one edge by at most 1.
Proof of Theorem 9. We focus on agent u in the network (Gk, α) and show that this agent
can change her strategy in a non-greedy way and thereby decrease her cost by a factor of n−15 ,
where n is the number of vertices of Gk. Let Su be agent u’s current strategy in (Gk, α) and
let S∗u be u’s strategy which only buys one edge towards vertex v. See Fig 8 (left and middle).
Let cost(u) and cost∗(u) denote agent u’s cost induced by strategy Su and S∗u, respectively.
For α = 2, we have
cost(u)
cost∗(u)
=
α(2 + k) + 3
α+ 3
=
7
5
+
2k
5
=
n− 1
5
,
where the last equality follows since k = n−82 , by construction.
Corollary 3. Uncapacitated Metric Min-Max Facility Location has a locality gap of n−15 ,
where n is the number of clients.
Proof. The corollary follows by using the “locality gap preserving” reduction provided in the
proof of Theorem 4 and the lower bound of Theorem 9.
The lower bound construction of Theorem 9 can be transformed into an instance of unca-
pacitated metric min-max facility location. Remember, that we have cost-equality and that
greedy strategy-changes of agent u in the NCG transfer one to one to greedy modifications
of the facility location solution. Thus, we have the property that the corresponding solution
to the facility location problem is locally optimal but resembles only a n−15 -approximation to
the globally optimal solution.
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